Porn, Rape and Justice
by: David Ramsay Steele
(An answer to a letter from Roderick Moore)
man views some pornographic material. Subsequently he goes out and commits
rape. I hold that he should be punished. Another man never views any
pornographic material, but without its assistance he takes it into his head
to rape someone, and does it. I hold that he should be punished. Assuming
the attendant circumstances are the same (injuries to the victim and so
forth), I hold that the punishment should be the same. In other words, if
anyone commits rape he should be punished for the rape and not for something
he did earlier, even though the earlier action predisposed him to commit
rape. Similarly, if a man spends the morning watching the women who happen
to pass by his window, and then commits rape, he should be punished for
committing rape, and the fact that he spent the morning watching female
pedestrians should not modify the treatment he receives, even though that
fact did predispose him to commit the crime. Or, if a woman spends a lot of
time looking through catalogues and subsequently steals from a shop, she
should be punished for stealing, not for looking through catalogues.
I use the word 'punished' in
the broad sense, to refer to anything which is done to a person regardless of his consent
because he has broken a rule, and not necessarily to imply any element of retribution. In
my view 'punishment' should be based on compulsory restitution by the aggressor to the
victim.
I take it that so far Roderick Moore is in agreement, only he would add that when
the man viewed pornography and committed rape, he should perhaps be punished for two
separate offences, rape and pornography. I say 'perhaps' because Roderick Moore has not
committed himself to the view that pornography should be criminalized. He argues that if it were ever demonstrated that pornography
predisposed to rape, then pornography should be outlawed. He thinks that this has not yet
been demonstrated, so presumably for the time being he is opposed to any further measures
against pornography, and supports the repeal of those restrictions which exist.
Suppose
that psychologists did come to the conclusion that pornography predisposed to rape. A man
views some pornography. Subsequently he commits no rape, nor does he hurt anyone in any
way. Roderick Moore recommends that this man be punished. Why? Because although he has not
harmed anyone, he has joined a class of people statistically more likely to commit rape.
The people who supplied him with the pornographic material will also be punished, though
they too have not raped or otherwise attacked anyone.
In case Moore intends to take this
discussion any further, it would be a great help if he committed himself definitely on the
following questions. Suppose it were demonstrated that people who consumed pornography
were less likely to commit rape, should everyone he compelled to consume pornography?
Suppose that meat-eating predisposed to violent assault, should meat-eating he prohibited?
Suppose that watching football predisposed to violence, should watching football he
forbidden? Suppose that a particular religion predisposed to crime, should that religion
be outlawed? Since men are far more likely to commit crimes of aggression than women,
should men be eliminated from the species, as described in Edmund Cooper's novel,
Who
Needs Men? If it were shown that there was a genetic element in the causation of crimes of violence, should all convicted of these crimes be
automatically sterilized? If it were shown that consumption of any drug or food (such as
alcohol or sugar) predisposed to aggression, should that substance be outlawed? If there
were found to be a correlation between aggression and certain hormone levels or other
bodily states, should chemical or surgical 'treatment' be compulsory for those individuals
with those states? (Or in other words, should wilful persistence with high hormone levels,
when the means are available for 'correction', he a crime?) If it were found that the
sight of bra-less women wearing tight sweaters raised the incidence of rape, should this
attire he banned? (Perhaps even greater effect could be achieved by enforcing the wearing
of veils and shapeless robes, Khomeini-style). If attractive shop windows increase the
occurrence of shoplifting, should dull shop windows he compulsory? Since implementation of
the doctrines of bolshevism, fascism, nationalism and social democracy has resulted in
enormous 'harm', far outweighing a slight increase in the frequency of rape, should
dissemination of these doctrines he banned?
Another example of 'causation' which Roderick
Moore might like to consider is the example of a young man driving a high-powered sports
car. There is no doubt that such a person is considerably more likely to injure someone in
a road accident than the average motorist, although a particular young man with such a car
might be the safest driver on the roads (just as a particular consumer of pornography
might be the least likely person in all the world to attack anyone). Does it follow that
young men should be forbidden to drive high-powered sports cars, or to drive at all? In a
free market. and in present-day circumstances, such a young man has to pay a higher
insurance premium. It seems that in Roderick Moore's world, all cases of differential
insurance premiums would have to disappear, at least where there was any element of choice
on the part of the client. Those formerly liable for higher premiums would simply be forbidden to engage
in the activities in question. The insurance companies can supply Roderick Moore with a
long list of activities statistically correlated with 'harm', and he can expand his
horizons by seeking to have them all banned.
Maybe Mr. Moore is different, but most
persecutors of pornography do not seem very interested in alternative kinds of 'harmful'
cultural influences. At the time of the 'Yorkshire Ripper' killings, mobs of feminist
fanatics demonstrated aggressively outside porn theatres in the North of England. When
Sutcliffe was caught, it turned out that he was not especially influenced by porn, but
very heavily influenced by Christianity. The demonstrators did not transfer their
attentions to churches.
Roderick Moore's justification for anti-pornography legislation
does not apply to some sections of the population. Take a paralysed or severely crippled
person, lacking the physical strength or mobility to force anyone else to submit. Moore
could have not objection to permitting such a person to consume pornography. However, the
list could he extended: individuals shortly to die, lighthouse keepers or those set on
lone voyages of exploration in space and why not the entire female sex? Furthermore, it
might be that consumption of pornography increased the likelihood of rape, but that
further statistical work showed some sub-classes of porn consumers to be immune from this
effect, or to display the opposite effect. The young man with the high-powered sports car
has willy-nilly to pay a higher premium because it is too costly for the insurance
companies to get figures for all the sub-classes. He has no legitimate gripe against the
companies, because he is not entitled to insurance. Insurance companies may, in a
libertarian society, discriminate among clients on any grounds at all: commercial
pressures ensure that they will usually discriminate on grounds of risk, insofar as the
required information is cheap enough. But under Moore's Law, the person being prosecuted for the crime of consuming porn could
presumably pay for the statistical research needed to establish his membership of a
sub-class with zero or negative correlation, whereupon the action would he withdrawn, and
the prosecution sent the bill for the research. (If for his sub-class pornography
consumption were negatively correlated with rape, then subsequently members of that
sub-class would be liable to punishment if they did not consume porn).
AMBIGUOUS ARGUMENT
I raised some of these questions in my first reply to Moore, but he has not really faced
up to them. The only reason presented by Moore for outlawing pornography is that it might
predispose people to commit rape, admittedly without determining that any one of them
commits rape. It is quite easy to show that thousands of innocent activities may well
predispose people to commit crimes of aggression. Will Moore now swallow the totalitarian
hook, and extend coercive control 'over everyone's lives, governing their recreations and
lifestyles in the minutest degree? Or will he flinch from this conclusion, and in that
case will he agree that prohibition of pornography cannot be justified, or will he seek to
justify its prohibition on altogether different grounds, the nature of which he has yet to
disclose?
The first two paragraphs of his second contribution (above) seem to provide a
sort of answer, but actually glide over the issue. My remarks about "changing
consciousness" were intended to encompass changes in any alleged "unconscious
part" of the mind. I did not mention "free will", and the
"strong element of chance and uncertainty" is not contested by Moore. No one
disputes that the majority of consumers of pornography never commit rape (just as the
majority of window shoppers do not become shop lifters), and that under the regime
contemplated by Roderick Moore these innocents would be punished because of rapes they had
never committed nor had a hand in committing, simply because the minority of rapists
constituted a slightly larger percentage of the class of pornography-consumers than of the
class of pornography abstainers. Nor is it seriously open to question that some people
will never commit rape, no matter how much pornography they might consume.
Moore contends
that pornography can be "distinguished" from the other cases, and that it
effects its influence in a different 'way'. But that is not the point. What matters for
Moore's stated argument are the results. Does pornography make people more likely to
commit rape? Does being a Roman Catholic make someone more likely to become a criminal?
Does watching football make people more likely to attack other people in the street? Does
beer make people more likely to get into fights? As a matter of fact, the
prima facie case
for an affirmative answer to the last three questions is quite strong, whereas Moore
volunteers that the present verdict on the first question must be 'not proven'. The 'way'
in which these practices bring about the statistical results has no bearing on Moore's
argument as he has stated it.
Moore's reasoning in these first two paragraphs is
ambiguous. It could mean (a) that pornography works in a distinctive 'way', therefore the
other cases cited by Steele are unlikely to be true, or (b) that it is not sufficient for
some pastime to increase the likelihood of aggression for Moore to advocate its forcible
suppression; the pastime must accomplish this in a particular 'way'. Now (a) is false,
because these other cases are manifestly quite plausible, and Moore has not disputed any
of them. But even if they were unlikely, it would be interesting to hear whether Moore
accepted the consistent conclusion in those hypothetical cases. As for (b), I
am struck by
Moore's dragging in 'free will', which is immaterial to his first argument or my reply. It
seems that Moore might now be arguing that influences which predispose to aggression ought
not to be outlawed, unless they do so by interfering with 'free will', and that pornography interferes
with free will whilst football does not. This would introduce a new element into Moore's
argument. No longer would resulting 'harm' be a sufficient reason for prohibition,
although the way he has expressed him self suggests that everything hangs upon
consequential harm and naught else.
I find the reference to "basic human instincts
very deeply rooted in the primitive parts of the brain" quite incredible, and none
the less so for being quoted from a book. Moore disclaims that it means that someone who
has seen a porno-flic is helpless to prevent himself committing rape, but if it does not
mean that, exactly what does it mean? I suppose that someone with a history of
snatch-and-run raids on jewellers' shops, who intends to give up this occupation and turn
over a new leaf, might be ill advised to amuse himself by hanging around jewellers' shops
fantasising about the beautiful raids he could carry off.
The argument attributed to
Eysenck and Nias incidentally exhibits a very common fallacy: the assumption which is most
innate is also that which is most powerful, basic or physical. The idea that culture
modifies our more deliberate intellectual processes, leaving unaltered a seething mass of
unconscious "instincts" is false. Culture modifies physiology, and some of our
most basic, spontaneous and irresistible urges are due to what we have learned.
I did not
suggest that the application of Roderick Moore's definition would raise
"insuperable" problems, but merely that it would conform equally well to his
description of our present "chaotic anti-pornography laws, with their subjective and
emotionally loaded terminology". He has said nothing to refute this. Consider
The Romans in Britain, Delta of' Venus, The Story of O,
Lolita, Last Exit from Brooklyn, and
Lady Chatterly's Lover. Now, one by one, Mr Moore, are these
"material produced for
entertainment as an end in itself", lacking "communicative content"? Or are
they "made lively and interesting as a means of conveying ideas more effectively"? No
shilly-shallying;
yes or no! Come now, is it really so simple?
No entertainment "lacks communicative
content" and it is impossible to manufacture a piece of entertaining narrative which
does not communicate facts and value judgements. There is a distinction between
entertainment and instruction or exhortation, but it is not as simple as Moore makes out,
and I do not see why he has such a down on entertainment, or why the intent is so
important here. The works of Krafft-Ebing and Havelock Ellis are still sold in porn shops.
They were not intended as entertainment, but clearly some folk find them absorbing.
Fanny
Hill now has historical interest, though originally intended purely as entertainment.
In
the Book of Genesis, as I recall, there is the account of how Jacob was living with his
three daughters. Since there were no young men around to serve them, the daughters got
together and decided to make their father drunk, whereupon they persuaded him to make love
to them, one after the other. (If I knew how to produce some of that ancient Palestianian
wine I could make a fortune). This story was not intended as entertainment, but to give a
complete account of the genealogy of the Children of Israel. However I found it
fascinating at the age of ten. On the other hand The Song of Solomon certainly is
"explicitly sexual material intended solely for entertainment", and would be
banned under Moore's Law. Some of its imagery is a little refined for Ann Summers, but it
has no other object than to get the juices flowing. I don't know which of these biblical
episodes is more likely to encourage rape by dehumanising sex, but I would guess the
former.
All pornography communicates ideas, and all laws restricting pornography ipso
facto restrict liberty in the communication of ideas. "Changing my mind"
includes, on the supposition that I disapprove of watching films like Emmanuelle, deciding
to watch them.
The Libertarian Alliance leaflet Free Speech argues that pornography should
be fully lawful even if it could be shown to have harmful effects, just as the same
principle should be applied to religious and political movements. Moore took issue with
this, suggesting that the liberal or libertarian definition of freedom was "the right
to do anything you want provided that it does NOT harm anyone else". I replied that
there were numerous ways in which we should be free to harm other people, and gave a few
examples which not only libertarians, but a much wider range of opinion, would accept. Now
Roderick Moore protests that I "must surely accept that at least some actions which harm
other people should be illegal"! Of course. That was never denied. Harm to others is
a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for justifiably prohibiting some species of
conduct.
The beginning of Moore's first letter suggests that he thinks any resulting harm
is justification of prohibition: his subsequent reference to "a violation of human
rights" suggests a narrower criterion, though not narrow enough for my
liking.
It is justified to prohibit violations of people's rights. In the Libertarian view, it is
justified to prohibit only violation of people's rights. It is not justified to prohibit
actions which are not violations of rights but which 'cause' violations of rights, in the
sense of exercising a persuasive effect on people so that they become more likely to
commit violations of rights. It ought to be prohibited to beat someone's head in, except
in defence or retaliation, but it ought not to be prohibited to sell whisky, even though
it is quite certain that people who consume whisky are more likely to attack other
individuals and beat their heads in.
FREEDOM FROM RAPE?
Liberty does not mean a guarantee
of security or safety or of the ability to realise one's goals. 'Liberty' in the social
sense has a special meaning. A person may be on the point of death by starvation, but
still free in the special sense, even though he is far from 'free' in the broad sense of being able to do what he
wishes. Some of the slaves in the American South were better fed, better housed and
generally more prosperous and secure than some of the wage workers in the North, that is,
they were 'more free' in the sense that various constraints on their actions were less.
Yet the poorest wage-workers were substantially free, and the 'richest' slaves not free at
all. Consider a country which is suddenly afflicted by frequent showers of deadly
meteorites, randomly killing and maiming people. People would become less secure, but they
would not necessarily be any less free. Nor does liberty mean minimum likelihood that
one's rights will be infringed. Consider a country where some trace element disappears
from the soil, causing people to become more short-tempered, and leading to a higher
incidence of deaths and injuries from violent quarrels. The risk of being attacked rises,
but the society is not necessarily any less free.
Opponents of liberty often confuse
freedom in the two senses. They think they have made a profound observation when they say
that in the free market individuals are 'free to starve'. The consequences of liberty for
security and prosperity are relevant to deciding whether we want liberty. But risk is
inherent in life, and there will always be innumerable kinds of risk which can be
diminished by curtailing liberty.
Roderick Moore seems to interpret "the principle of
freedom from sexual assault" to mean the desirability of anything which diminishes
the likelihood of sexual assault. If all males had their genitals and right arms amputated
at the age of five, that would greatly diminish the likelihood of sexual assault, though
I'm afraid it would be too modest a measure for some feminists. The fundamental principle
is the prohibition of aggression. But it is aggression to amputate people's arms and
genitals without their consent, and it is aggression to attack people who consume
pornography but have never hurt anyone.
SUSPENSION OF FREE WILL
If violations or rights
are punished and thus deterred, it is left to individuals to choose for themselves how
they will run their lives within that constraint. If reading James Bond stories makes
people more likely to commit murder, then people who read James Bond stories do so at the
risk of committing murder and thereby receiving punishment for this violation. But what of
cases where freedom of choice is over-ridden?
It is sometimes claimed that someone under
hypnosis can be given an instruction, activated by some signal after emerging from
hypnosis, which the hypnotic subject will then be incapable of resisting. For instance, A
could give B the command to strangle C upon hearing the world "adhesive". B
emerges from hypnosis, and a few days later A telephones B and says: "My Ming vase is
broken. Do you know a good adhesive?" B has forgotten all about the hypnosis and the
order, but nonetheless immediately strangles C, and could not possibly do otherwise. A
hypnotist, in other words, is a wizard who can put spells on people. This sounds like a
tall story to me, but suppose that it is true, I do not think that it poses any difficulty
for libertarian justice.
First, take the case where A puts B under hypnosis without B's
knowledge or consent. (Assume this is possible). In that case, morally and legally, it is
A who has strangled C, B was just an instrument, and is guiltless. In fact B is also a
victim, and A is more culpable than if he had strangled C with his own hands, because in
addition to that offence of murder, A is also guilty of an offence against B. Now, take
the case where B goes to A and agrees to be put under hypnosis as an aid to abandoning the
smoking habit. A says: "Upon waking, all desire for cigarettes will have vanished.
Oh, and by the way, when you hear the word 'adhesive' you will go up to C, put your hands
round his neck and throttle him. Now wake up. That will be two hundred pounds
please". This is basically, like the previous example, only A is now additionally
guilty of defrauding B of £200.
Next consider the case where B goes to A with the
intention of being hypnotised to kill C. (Suppose that B thinks he will do the killing
more efficiently if he is hypnotised). In that case, B is fully guilty. The fact that he
'could not help himself' at the time of the killing does not exonerate him. His visit to A
is part of his preparation for the murder, like doing wrist exercises to improve his
strangling ability. A is also culpable of assisting B to commit the murder much as if he
had knowingly sold B a murder weapon. None of this would be altered in principle if
hypnotic suggestion worked only some of the time. Even if it worked only once in a
thousand, A and B would still be culpable if that one in a thousand shot materialised. (If
the hypnosis does not work, and no killing occurs, it is questionable whether there could
be anything punishable in a libertarian society. Be that as it may, it seems that the
matter should be treated as analogous to shooting at someone with a revolver. with only
one of the chambers loaded).
If a prospective rapist deliberately went to see some
pornography, intending that it would get his steam up so that he would he a more effective
rapist, the pornography would be part of his preparation for the rape. Arguably, someone
who provided facilities for target practice knowing that it was preparation for an
assassination would be implicated as an accessory in the murder, and someone providing
pornography knowing that it was preparation for rape would be implicated in the rape. It
is immaterial here whether the 'preparation' suspended the subsequent operation of 'free
will' or not. The legal doctrine of responsibility should extend back to the point of
decision. It is the individual's responsibility to avoid courses of action which will
subsequently lead to a decline in the efficacy of his 'free will'. Someone liable to
strike at others if he loses his temper is responsible for seeing that he does not lose
his temper in the company of others. It is a matter of indifference whether, in the second
or two before striking out, he was capable of controlling himself. Though that is interesting philosophically, it
ought to be of no interest legally. Recent cases in Britain where women were let off
murder and other offences because they suffered from pre-menstrual tension are gross
miscarriages of justice. A woman knows what pre-menstrual tension is, and it is up to her
to arrange her affairs so that she avoids situations likely to lead to murder. If
necessary, she should live alone either all the time or several days out of every 28. If
she does not, she is responsible for the consequences. (Even more remarkable was the case
in San Francisco a couple of years ago. A member of the city council killed another
councilman and the Mayor, in a carefully planned way. His defence was that he was
"high on sugar", having eaten a lot of "junk food". The jury accepted
that defence and the killer was acquitted of murder, though convicted on a lesser charge).
Now let us return to the hypnosis example and take the final step which makes it closely
analogous with Moore's view of pornography, by removing any intent to cause murder on the
parts of both hypnotist and subject. Suppose that it is just an unfortunate side effect of
hypnosis as an aid to stopping smoking that it causes a suspension of free will and an
uncontrollable impulse to commit murder, a random once in a thousand times. Neither the
hypnotist nor his client want murder to result. What then? In cases where no murder
results, there is no offence, and neither hypnotist nor client are punishable. In the case
where a murder does result, the subject is punishable, but not the hypnotist. A known risk
was incurred, and the killer is responsible.
Even if viewing pornography makes one in a
thousand individuals incapable of resisting the urge to rape, this is a risk the consumer
has to accept. Only in the case where the porn vendor knew about his effect, the porn
consumer could not reasonably be expected to know about it, and the porn vendor concealed
it, could any responsibility for the rape attach to the vendor. In that case the rapist
would be able to bring an action against the vendor, as well as the rape victim against the
rapist. It is analogous to the case where a motorist injures a pedestrian, the motorist
suffering drowsiness due to a medicine which the physician had declared to be free of
side-effects.
The examples of the porn-controlled rapist and the hypnosis-controlled
strangler are peculiar because at the time of the aggressive acts, there existed a
definite intention to commit them, yet it is argued that the actors could not help
themselves, that their actions were not wilful, and perhaps even not 'actions'. The common
theory is that an intentional act is a wilful act, and I believe that this theory is true.
But I do not think that justice depends upon acceptance of this controversial position in
philosophical psychology. Supposing that the human mind was unlike my view of it, and like
Roderick Moore's view of it, or J.K. Galbraith's, I would hold that in some cases legal
responsibility should be imputed despite the absence of psychological responsibility at
the time of the offence.
DOES PORN ENCOURAGE RAPE?
Even if pornography could suspend free
will, I do not think a libertarian society could countenance making pornographers in
general liable for actions arising out of rape. In conclusion, though, I cannot refrain
from saying something about the supposed links between pornography and rape.
"
Pornography" is a world of infinite variety. There are page three girls and the
Miss World contest. There are portrayals of people swyving in all positions, combinations
and settings. There are numerous categories of porn for individuals with specialised
tastes. But most pornography is consumed by men, and most deals with quite 'normal'
heterosexual behaviour without any suggestion of violence. Pornography reflects fairly
accurately the distribution of sexual preferences in the male population. It does not
present any particular "view" of sex different to that prevailing
generally. Roderick Moore suggests that it might "encourage men to view
sex in a dehumanised and impersonal way". But there is no reason why
pornography should do that, and most of it does not. Roderick Moore might
retort that the very notion of enjoying pornography comes under that
description, because the consumer of pornography is interested only in the
sexual thrill gained from contemplation of images, and not in whether, for
example, the woman depicted groaning in the throes of an orgasm collects
stamps or likes Ibsen. If that is what is meant by dehumanised and
impersonal sex, than I am afraid that this is merely a disapproving
description of male sex. The human male sex drive is typically
visually-oriented, easily triggered, indiscriminate, roving and predatory.
It is concerned with images quite dissociated from any intimate acquaintance
with the life and thoughts of the sex object. The only way you will ever
change that is by genetic engineering.
If pornography does dehumanise and
depersonalise sex, then salvation from rape is at hand. All sex shops sell
inflatable, life-sized, though somewhat crude and unlifelike, replicas of
women. Candidate rapists will instead purchase these simulacra, which will be
enjoyable at much lower cost than rape. The rape incidence should decline.
In case men have not been encouraged sufficiently to view sex in a
dehumanised and impersonal way, the simulacra could easily be programmed to
discourse on philately and Ibsen, not very well, but better than most
women. Can rape be cut in this way? I suspect not. As Karl Kraus pointed
out, making love to another person is a poor substitute for masturbation.
The objective of sexual love is a certain kind of interaction with another
intelligent consciousness. Physical sensations are merely instruments. From
the standpoint of physical sensations as ends in themselves, the other
person is liable to be a hindrance. It seems to me that most rapes are
attempts at love-making rather than masturbation: the presence of another
mind is crucial. One no more makes love in order to experience physical
sensations than one climbs a mountain in order to exercise one's muscles. So
a simulacrum would not do, if the human partner knew her to be a simulacrum, at least until a simulacrum were developed to the android level
envisioned by the late and grievously lamented Philip K. Dick, with a
genuine mind and emotions of her own. Acquiring these, however, she would
acquire rights.
Although in one sense dehumanised sex is nothing but male
human sex, and ineradicable, in another sense it may prove impossible to
dehumanise sex. From the Darwinian point of view it is easy to see how the
demand for contact with another mind would be adaptive (vetoing diversion of
the sex drive onto objects other than living humans), just as insistence on
an affinity with the precise contents of that mind (philately and Ibsen)
would not have been conducive to reproductive success.
Rape is theft of
private property. It is taking what rightfully belongs to somebody else,
without that person's consent. It is not a sickness, any more than robbing
banks is a sickness. Like all crime, it is rational pursuit of a goal. There
is nothing unnatural or inhuman about it; very likely the human species
would have died out several times over but for rape. In a civilised and
highly populated world, this biological function has become unnecessary.
Rape is a form of aggression which frequently imposes terrible mental
suffering upon the victim. It is up to us to organise society in such a way
as to discourage rape by raising its costs to the rapist.
The economic
relations between pornography and rape are complex. On the one hand,
pornography is a substitute for rape. More effective substitutes are
opportunities for voluntary sex with partners, such as prostitution,
swinging singles clubs and marriage. On the other hand, I certainly would
not rule out the possibility that pornography predisposed to rape, by exciting
people's sexual appetites. Anything that stimulates individuals' sexual
urges will ceteris paribus increase rape. Supposing that poor diet
diminished the sexual drive, an improvement in diet would increase the
incidence of rape. Yet it is possible that pornography might also exert a
countervailing influence, by making it easier for the sexually hungry
person to engage in some of the non-aggressive substitutes for rape. It is
also possible that pornography might have varying effects on different
sections of the male population. There are some simple empirical tests that
could easily be carried out. For instance: does the incidence of rape
increase during the hours following the broadcasting of the Miss World
Contest?
© Libertarian Alliance 2001
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Further reading:
“Those who explore the ensuing pages will find them marked by a certain ribaldry, even when they discuss topics commonly regarded as grave. I do not apologise for this, for life in the Republic has always seemed to me to be far more comic than serious.” Mencken.
Or, if a woman spends a lot of time looking through catalogues and
subsequently steals from a shop, she should be punished for stealing,
not for looking through catalogues.
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Suppose it were demonstrated that people who consumed pornography were
less likely to commit rape, should everyone he compelled to consume
pornography?
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If attractive shop windows increase the occurrence of shoplifting,
should dull shop windows he compulsory?
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The insurance companies can supply Roderick Moore with a long list of
activities statistically correlated with 'harm', and he can expand his
horizons by seeking to have them all banned.
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When Sutcliffe was caught, it turned out that he was not especially
influenced by porn, but very heavily influenced by Christianity. The
demonstrators did not transfer their attentions to churches.
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Take a paralysed or severely crippled person, lacking the physical
strength or mobility to force anyone else to submit. Moore could have
not objection to permitting such a person to consume pornography.
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What matters for Moore's stated argument are the results. Does
pornography make people more likely to commit rape? Does being a Roman
Catholic make someone more likely to become a criminal? Does watching
football make people more likely to attack other people in the street?
Does beer make people more likely to get into fights?
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I find the reference to "basic human instincts very deeply rooted
in the primitive parts of the brain" quite incredible, and none
the less so for being quoted from a book.
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The argument attributed to Eysenck and Nias incidentally exhibits a
very common fallacy: the assumption which is most innate is also that
which is most powerful, basic or physical. The idea that culture
modifies our more deliberate intellectual processes, leaving unaltered
a seething mass of unconscious "instincts" is false.
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In the Book of Genesis, as I recall, there is the account of how Jacob
was living with his three daughters. Since there were no young men
around to serve them, the daughters got together and decided to make
their father drunk, whereupon they persuaded him to make love to them,
one after the other. (If I knew how to produce some of that ancient
Palestianian wine I could make a fortune).
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It ought to be prohibited to beat someone's head in, except in defence
or retaliation, but it ought not to be prohibited to sell whisky, even
though it is quite certain that people who consume whisky are more
likely to attack other individuals and beat their heads in.
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Consider a country where some trace element disappears from the soil,
causing people to become more short-tempered, and leading to a higher
incidence of deaths and injuries from violent quarrels. The risk of
being attacked rises, but the society is not necessarily any less
free.
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If all males had their genitals and right arms amputated at the age of
five, that would greatly diminish the likelihood of sexual assault,
though I'm afraid it would be too modest a measure for some feminists.
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The legal doctrine of responsibility should extend back to the point
of decision. It is the individual's responsibility to avoid courses of
action which will subsequently lead to a decline in the efficacy of
his 'free will'.
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Recent cases in Britain where women were let off murder and other
offences because they suffered from pre-menstrual tension are gross
miscarriages of justice.
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Recent cases in Britain where women were let off murder and other
offences because they suffered from pre-menstrual tension are gross
miscarriages of justice. A
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Even if viewing pornography makes one in a thousand individuals
incapable of resisting the urge to rape, this is a risk the consumer
has to accept.
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It is analogous to the case where a motorist injures a pedestrian, the
motorist suffering drowsiness due to a medicine which the physician
had declared to be free of side-effects.
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But most pornography is consumed by men, and most deals with quite
'normal' heterosexual behaviour without any suggestion of violence.
Pornography reflects fairly accurately the distribution of sexual
preferences in the male population.
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The human male sex drive is typically visually-oriented, easily
triggered, indiscriminate, roving and predatory. It is concerned with
images quite dissociated from any intimate acquaintance with the life
and thoughts of the sex object.
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As Karl Kraus pointed out, making love to another person is a poor
substitute for masturbation. The objective of sexual love is a certain
kind of interaction with another intelligent consciousness. Physical
sensations are merely instruments.
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One no more makes love in order to experience physical sensations than
one climbs a mountain in order to exercise one's muscles.
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From the Darwinian point of view it is easy to see how the demand for
contact with another mind would be adaptive (vetoing diversion of the
sex drive onto objects other than living humans), just as insistence
on an affinity with the precise contents of that mind (philately and
Ibsen) would not have been conducive to reproductive success..
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There are some simple empirical tests that could easily be carried
out. For instance: does the incidence of rape increase during the
hours following the broadcasting of the Miss World Contest?
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